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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
  Patrick Hanlin ("Hanlin") appeals the district 
court's denial of his motion for a reduction in sentence.  For 
the reasons stated herein, the district court's judgment is 
affirmed. 
 I.  
  On February 27, 1990, a jury in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania convicted Hanlin of:  (1) conspiracy to 
distribute and possession with intent to distribute LSD, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) possession with intent to 
distribute in excess of 10 grams of LSD, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(v).  Hanlin's offense 
involved 24.448 grams of a blotter paper/LSD mixture or, as 
alternatively quantified, 3354 dosage units of LSD.  At his 
original sentencing, the district court determined that the 
proper weight of the LSD for sentencing purposes was the weight 
of the pure LSD (3354 LSD dosage units x .05 milligrams per 
dosage unit1 = 167.7 mgs of LSD) rather than the combined weight 
                     
 
   1  The Drug Enforcement Administration has determined that 
the standard dosage unit of pure LSD is 0.05 mgs per dose.  
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (backg'd). 
  
of the LSD plus the paper carrier medium.  Based upon this 
finding, the district court sentenced Hanlin to two terms of 30 
months of imprisonment, to run concurrently, three years of 
supervised release, and a $50 special assessment on each count of 
conviction.   
  Both parties appealed.  Hanlin challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, and the 
government challenged the district court's decision to use the 
weight of the pure LSD, rather than the combined weight of the 
LSD and the paper carrier medium.  
  On July 15, 1991, in an unpublished opinion, this 
Court vacated Hanlin's sentence and remanded the case to the 
district court for resentencing in accordance with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 
S. Ct. 1919 (1991).  See United States v. Hanlin, Nos. 90-3616, 
90-3688, 90-3689 & 90-3706 (3d Cir. July 15, 1991).  The Chapman 
decision dictates that the weight of the blotter paper, upon 
which LSD is found, must be included when determining the 
appropriate sentence for trafficking in LSD under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1).   
  Applying the Chapman decision, the district court 
determined the weight of the LSD/paper combination to be 24.448 
grams and, accordingly, sentenced Hanlin to 120 months on both 
counts of conviction, to run concurrently, two three-year terms 
of supervised release, and a special assessment of $50 on each 
count of conviction.  App. 66-69.  The court was constrained to 
impose the 120-month sentence because 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) 
  
mandates a minimum ten-year sentence for a person convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute in excess of 10 grams "of a 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of" LSD, and 
Hanlin had been in possession of 24.448 grams of such a LSD/paper 
"mixture."   
  On March 31, 1994, Hanlin filed the present motion 
for a reduction of sentence, relying on the amendment to 
Guideline § 2D1.1(c) ("Amendment 488"), effective as of November 
of 1993.  The amended guideline, in an explicatory footnote, 
provides: 
 In the case of LSD on a carrier medium (e.g., 
a sheet of blotter paper), do not use the 
weight of the LSD/carrier medium.  Instead, 
treat each dose of LSD on the carrier medium 
as equal to 0.4 mg of LSD for the purposes of 
the Drug Quantity Table. 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). 
  The Sentencing Commission chose the 0.4 mg per 
dose approach in the hope of alleviating "unwarranted disparity 
among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but of 
different carrier weights)" and to bring sentences for LSD in 
line proportionately with sentences involving other more 
dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP.  U.S.S.G. App. C, 
amend. 488.  Although the Drug Enforcement Administration's 
standard dosage unit for pure LSD is 0.05 mg, the Sentencing 
Commission chose to use 0.4 mg per dosage weight in order to 
assign some weight to the carrier medium.  Id.  The Commission 
did this in recognition that:  (1) "offense levels for most other 
controlled substances are based upon the weight of the mixture 
  
containing the controlled substance without regard to purity;" 
and (2) the Chapman decision holds that "the term `mixture or 
substance' in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) includes the carrier medium 
in which LSD is absorbed."  Id.   
  In his motion for a reduction of sentence, Hanlin 
asserted that Amendment 488 created a conflict between the 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Supreme Court's interpretation in 
Chapman of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), which imposes the mandatory 
minimum sentence.  Particularly, Hanlin pointed out that, if the 
court were to calculate the weight of the LSD involved in his 
offense under Amendment 488 (3354 dosage units x 0.4 mgs per 
dosage unit = 1341.6 mgs or 1.34 grams of LSD), he would not be 
subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 
841(b)(1).  He claimed that he must be resentenced in accordance 
with the weight calculation of Amendment 488; otherwise, his 
rights to due process and equal protection would be violated.   
  The Government responded to Hanlin's motion, 
asserting that the district court must comply with the holding of 
Chapman, which requires the entire weight of the carrier medium 
(i.e., blotter paper) to be included in the weight measurement 
applicable to determine the mandatory minimum sentence under § 
841(b)(1).  The Government further pointed out that the 
Commentary to § 2D1.1(c), as modified by Amendment 488, provides 
that, in spite of the new 0.4 mg dosage weight allocated to LSD, 
"this approach does not override the applicability of `mixture or 
substance' for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum 
sentence (see Chapman; § 5G1.1(b))."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. 
  
(backg'd).  Thus, the Government concluded that Hanlin's motion 
for a reduction of sentence should be denied.   
  On August 19, 1994, the district court denied 
Hanlin's motion, reasoning that the commentary to § 2D1.1 (quoted 
above) contradicts Hanlin's contention that the court must use 
Amendment 488's weight calculation for purposes of the mandatory 
minimum sentence statute.  App. 97-99.  This appeal followed.  
Applying the plenary standard of review, we affirm. 
 II. 
  Hanlin argues that the district court erred, in 
determining his eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence, by 
employing the "entire weight" approach adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Chapman rather than calculating the weight of the LSD 
pursuant to amended § 2D1.1(c).2  Although it might be sensible 
to use only one weight calculation method under both 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), it appears that neither the 
Sentencing Commission nor Congress, when it permitted the 1993 
amendments to take effect in November 1993, had that intent. 
  In Chapman, the Supreme Court held that "it is the 
weight of the blotter paper containing LSD, and not the weight of 
the pure LSD, which determines eligibility for the minimum 
sentence" under § 841(b)(1) of Title 21.  500 U.S. at 455; 111 S. 
Ct. at 1922.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
                     
    
2
  The amendment to Guidelines § 2D1.1(c) is applicable 
retroactively within the discretion of the district court.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also United States 
v. Telman, 28 F.3d 94, 96 (10th Cir. 1994). 
  
that, because the statute refers to the weight of a "mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD, so long as the 
blotter paper/LSD "mixture or substance" does contain a 
detectable amount of LSD, the "entire mixture or substance is to 
be weighed when calculating the sentence."  Id. at 459; 111 S. 
Ct. at 1924 (emphasis added).  In addition, the Court noted that 
Congress has treated other drugs, e.g., PCP and methamphetamine, 
differently by basing mandatory minimum sentences either upon the 
weight of the mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 
or upon a lower weight of the pure drug.  The Court reasoned that 
Congress's failure to provide a similar net weight of pure drug 
alternative for LSD indicates its intent that courts use the 
gross weight of the mixture or substance.  Id. 
  The Court found further support for its "entire 
weight" approach in the fact that the present mandatory minimum 
penalties for LSD originated from the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 
which "Congress adopted a `market-oriented' approach to punishing 
drug trafficking."  Id. at 460-61; 111 S. Ct. at 1925.  The Court 
noted that Congress's market approach relied upon the total 
quantity of the drug distributed -- cut or uncut -- rather than 
upon the purity of the drug.  Id. at 461; 111 S. Ct. at 1925.  
The Court explained that this approach was motivated by 
Congress's recognition that retail traffickers are the ones who 
keep the street markets going and, therefore, should not be 
punished less severely than their higher-ups even though they 
deal in smaller quantities of the pure drug.  Id.   
  
  Although the Guidelines paralleled the language in 
the mandatory minimum statute at the time Chapman was decided, 
id. at 457, 111 S. Ct. at 1923, and Amendment 488 changed that 
parallel language by adopting the 0.4 mg per dose approach, the 
amendment did not invalidate the holding of Chapman.  To the 
contrary, the amended language expressly excluded the use of the 
0.4 mg approach in determining the applicability of statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences.  Moreover, all the Circuits that 
have addressed this issue have so found.  See United States v. 
Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Mueller, 27 F.3d 494, 496-97 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Tucker, 20 
F.3d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1994) (analogizing penalties for cocaine 
base to those for LSD).3  We conclude that Amendment 488 neither 
invalidated nor implicitly overruled the Supreme Court's holding 
in Chapman.  
  Furthermore, Hanlin's mandatory minimum sentence 
would not be affected by a lesser sentence that might be computed 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.  As already stated, Amendment 
488 specifically provides that the 0.4 mg approach "does not 
override the definition of mixture or substance for the purposes 
of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; § 
                     
    
3
  In United States v. Stoneking, 34 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 
1994), the court held that the statutory mandatory minimum 
sentence is determined by weight of LSD, as provided by Amendment 
488's 0.4 mg per dose approach.  However, the Eighth Circuit 
vacated the panel opinion and judgment in Stoneking and the case 
was set for oral argument before the court en banc on December 6, 
1994. 
  
5G1.1(b))."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (backg'd).  In addition, 
Guideline § 5G1.1(b) specifies that a statutorily required 
minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence where that 
mandatory sentence is greater than the maximum of the guideline 
range.  Therefore, Hanlin's 10-year mandatory sentence, 
calculated on a drug amount which includes the gross weight of 
the mixture, takes precedence over any lesser Guidelines' 
sentencing range.   
  Indeed, even if the Sentencing Commission had 
intended the 0.4 mg per dose approach to be used in conjunction 
with the mandatory minimum statute, Chapman would still control.  
The Supreme Court in Chapman specifically stated that "[s]o long 
as it contains a detectable amount [of LSD], the entire mixture 
or substance is to be weighed when calculating the sentence."  
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 459; 111 S. Ct. at 1924 (emphasis added).  
The 0.4 mg approach adopted in Amendment 488 does not allow for 
the entire weight of the mixture to be used in calculating the 
defendant's sentence and, therefore, conflicts with Chapman if 
applied to the mandatory minimum statute.  See United States v. 
Tannis, 942 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1991) (guidelines cannot 
supersede statute).  In sum, as the First Circuit noted in Boot, 
25 F.3d at 55, until Congress or the Supreme Court revisits the 
issue, two different formulas will be used for calculating LSD 
quantity--one for statutory mandatory minimums and another for 
Guidelines sentencing range purposes.  The superior formula is 
the Guidelines' formula because it recognizes that weighing the 
entire carrier medium produces unwanted disparity among offenses 
  
involving the same quantity of LSD but different carrier weights, 
as well as among sentences for other more dangerous drugs; the 
formula of 0.4 mg per-dose correctly assigns some weight to the 
carrier medium, and recognizes that LSD is sold by dosage rather 
than weight.  However, until Congress expresses a desire to 
coordinate the calculation of LSD quantity under the Guidelines 
and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), we are bound by the Supreme Court's 
Chapman formula which requires that the entire carrier medium be 
weighed for minimum mandatory sentencing purposes.4   
   III.  
  In conclusion, we hold that Chapman governs the 
definition of "mixture or substance" for purposes of conviction 
and sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) and requires that the 
entire weight of the carrier/LSD mixture be used in calculating 
the drug amount.  Thus, even if Hanlin's Guidelines' sentencing 
range might be reduced by application of Amendment 488, the 10-
year sentence, imposed on Hanlin, would not be affected because 
Hanlin remains subject to the mandatory minimum sentence provided 
for by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) and Chapman.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the district court's denial of Hanlin's motion for a reduction of 
sentence.  
                     
    
4
  We find Hanlin's other arguments, that application of the 
mandatory minimum sentence violated his right to due process and 
that the rule of lenity required the LSD involved in his 
conviction be weighed pursuant to amended § 2D1.1, to be without 
merit. 
